In this essay I will describe a large comparative study of national innovation systems that has just been completed, tell something of what motivated the study and how it was organized and undertaken, and highlight some of the more interesting findings. This is a difficult task, for the project was not only large but also complex.
understanding of the innovation systems of particular countries, going for behind anything written on those countries before. To describe and summarize in compact form what came out of the project simply is impossible. I must pick and choose and hint.
The project was undertaken to try to throw some light on a very complicated and important set of issues. The slowdown of growth since the early 1970s in all of the advanced industrial nations, the rise of Japan as a major economic and technological power, the relative decline of the United States, and widespread concerns in Europe about being behind both, has led to a rash of writing and new policy departures concerned with supporting the technical innovative powers of national firms. At the same time the enhanced technical sophistication of Korea, Taiwan, and other newly industrializing countries (nics) has broadened the range of nations whose firms are competitive players in fields which used to be the preserve of only a few, and led other nations who today have a weak manufacturing sector to wonder how they might emulate the performance of the successful nics. There clearly is a new spirit of what might be called 'techno-nationalism' in the air, combining a strong belief that the technological capabilities of a nation's firms are a key source of their competitive performance, with the belief that these capabilities are in a sense national, and can be built by national action.
It is this climate that has given rise to the current strong interest in national innovation systems, their similarities and differences, and in the extent and manner that these differences explain variation in national economic performance. There now may be more awareness and research about such national differences than on any other area where comparative institutional analysis would seem interesting and illuminating.
The project on which I report here was born of this intellectual climate, and came out of belief on the part of the participants that much of the writing and argument were somewhat hyped, and rather haphazard. Moreover, many of the allegedly comparative studies in fact had concentrated on one country-in recent times usually Japan-with the comparison with other countries largely implicit. The actual comparative studies tended to be of two or a very small group of countries. This limitation struck the project participants as particularly serious in view of the absence of a well articulated and verified analytic framework linking institutional arrangements to technological and economic performance. In the absence of such a framework there were (and are) only weak constraints on the inclinations of analysts to draw possibly spurious causal links between differences in institutional structures that clearly are there, and differences in performance which clearly are there also. Different authors have focused on different things and made different kinds of arguments about why this feature or that was an important 348 factor behind strong or weak performance. A broadening of a set of countries considered simultaneously seemed to us an important way to tighten these constraints by enlarging the number of 'points' that a causal theory had to 'fit 1 . The way I have been putting the matter clearly signals that the orientation of this project has been to carefully describe and compare, and try to understand, rather than to theorize first and then attempt to prove or calibrate the theory. However, a comparative study like this requires, at the least, some agreement on basic terms and concepts.
There is, first of all, the concept of a national innovation system itself. Each of the terms can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and there is the question of whether, in a world where technology and business are increasingly transnational, the concept as a whole makes much sense.
Consider the term 'innovation'. In this study we, the participants, interpret the term rather broadly, to encompass the processes by which firms master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to them, whether or not they are new to the universe, or even to the nation. We do so for several reasons. First, the activities, and investments associated with becoming the leader in the introduction of a new product or process, and those associated with staying near the head of the pack, or catching up, are much less sharply distinguishable than commonly is presumed. Second, much of the interest in innovative capability is tied to concern about economic performance, and here it is certainly the broader concept rather than the narrower one (the determinants of being first) that matters. This means that our orientation is not limited to the behavior of firms at the world's technology forefront, or to institutions doing the most advanced scientific research, although in some countries the focus is here, but is more broadly on the factors influencing national technological capabilities.
Then there is the term 'system 1 . While to some the word connotes something that is consciously designed and built, this is far from the orientation here. Rather the concept here is of a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance, in the sense above, of national firms. There is no presumption that the system was, in some sense, consciously designed, or even that the set of institutions involved works together smoothly and coherently. Rather, the 'systems' concept is that of a set of institutional actors that, together, play the major role in influencing innovative performance. The broad concept of innovation that we have adopted has forced us to consider much more than simply the actors doing research and development. Indeed, a problem with the broader definition of innovation is that it provides no sharp guide to just what should be included in the innovation system, and what can be left out. More on this later. 349
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Finally, there is the concept of 'national' system. On the one hand, the concept may be too broad. The system of institutions supporting technical innovation in one field, say pharmaceuticals, may have very little overlap with the system of institutions supporting innovations in another field, say aircraft. On the other hand, in many fields of technology, including both pharmaceuticals and aircraft, a number of the institutions are or act transnational. Indeed, for many of the participants in this study, one of the key interests was in exploring whether, and if so in what ways, the concept of a 'national' system made any sense nowadays. National governments act as if it did. However, that presumption, and the reality, may not be aligned.
The studies in this project are unified by at least broad agreement on the definitional and conceptual issues discussed above. They also were guided by certain common understandings of the way technical advance proceeds, and the key processes and institutional actors involved, that are now widely shared among scholars of technical advance. In a way these understandings do provide a common analytic framework, not wide enough to encompass all of the variables and relationships that are likely to be important, not sharp enough to tightly guide empirical work, but broad enough and pointed enough to provide a common structure in which one can have some confidence.
In particular, our inquiry was strongly shaped by our shared understandings about the complex intertwining of science and technology that marks the modern world. In the first place, we take the position that technology at any time needs to be recognized as consisting of both a set of specific designs and practices, and a body of generic knowledge that surrounds these and provides understanding of how things work, key variables effecting performance, the nature of currently binding constraints, and promising approaches to pushing these back. In most fields of technology a considerable portion of generic understanding stems from operating and design experience with products and machines and their components, and generalizations reflecting on these. Thus, consider a mechanic's guide, or the general knowledge of potters, or steel makers.
However, over the last century science has played an increasing role in the understandings related to technology. Indeed most modern fields of technology today have associated with them formal scientific or engineering disciplines like metallurgy, computer science, and chemical engineering. These kinds of disciplines are basically about technological understanding, and reflect attempts to make that understanding more scientific. An important consequence has been that, nowadays, formal academic training in the various applied sciences and engineering disciplines has become virtually a prerequisite for understanding a technology.
The intertwining of science and technology which began to occur a 350
century ago led to the rise of the industrial research laboratory as the dominant locus of technological innovation, first in the chemical and electrical industries, and then more broadly. These facilities, dedicated to advancing technology, and staffed by academically trained scientists and engineers, were closely tied to individual business enterprises.
It is important to understand that not all of the activities and investments made by firms in innovating are conducted in R&D laboratories, or get counted as R&D. The extent to which they do varies from industry to industry. Where firms are small, or where firms are engaged in designing products to order for individual customers, much of innovative work may not be counted as R&D. Nonetheless, while not always counted as R&D, and while often drawing extensively on external sources like universities and government labs, in most industries the lion's share of innovative effort is made by the firms themselves.
There are several reasons. First, after technology has been around for a period of time, in order to orient innovative work fruitfully one needs detailed knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses and areas where improvements would yield high payoffs, and this knowledge tends to reside with those who use the technology, generally firms and their customers and suppliers. Second, profiting from innovation in many cases requires the coordination of R&D, production, and marketing, which tends to proceed much more effectively within an organization that itself does all of these. These arguments hold whether one defines the innovation concept narrowly, as the introduction of a product or process that is truly new, or whether one defines it broadly as we do in the study, as the introduction of something that is new to the firm. Thus, all of the country studies paid a considerable amount of attention to the activities and investments being undertaken by firms.
The other two institutional actors with which all of the country studies were concerned are universities (and scientific and technical educational structures more generally), and governments and their policies as these influence industrial innovation. University and kindred institutions play two different kinds of roles in modern industrial innovation systems. They are the place where scientists and engineers who go into industry get their formal training. And in most (but not all) countries they are the locus of a considerable amount of research in the disciplines that are associated with particular technologies. To a much greater extent than commonly realized, university research programs are not undifferentiated parts of a national innovation system broadly defined, but rather are keyed into particular technologies and particular industries. University training, and research, that supports technical innovation in farming and the food processing industries simply is very different than university teaching and research that 351 supports the electronic industries. Thus, a major question in this study was how the research and teaching orientation of a nation's universities reflected, or molded, the industries where technological innovation was important in the nation. And, of course, the individual country studies looked closely at the range of government programs and policies bearing on industrial innovation. As is the case with the activities of universities, many government programs are focused specifically on particular technologies or industries, and these obviously were of central interest. However, as noted in my earlier discussion of the meaning of an 'innovation system', given the broad way we are using the term innovation, innovative performance cannot be cleanly separated from economic performance and competitiveness more broadly. Thus in many, cases the examination of government policies bearing on industrial innovation had to get into things like monetary and trade policies.
In designing the study the participants faced a quandary. From the discussion above it is obvious that a very wide range of factors influence the innovative performance of a nation's industries. The desire for comparability across the studies seemed to call for a rather elaborate list of things all country studies would cover. Yet it was apparent that the most interesting feature of a country's innovation system varied significantly across countries, and we wanted to illuminate these. Limits on resources and space foreclosed doing both. Our compromise involved two strategic decisions. First, we agreed on the limited list of features all country studies were to cover, e.g. the allocation of R&D activity and the sources of its funding, the characteristics of firms and the important industries, the roles of universities, and the government policies expressly aimed to spur and mold industrial innovation. Beyond these the authors were encouraged to pick out and highlight what they thought were the most important and interesting characteristics of their country. But second, considerable effort was put into identifying the kinds of comparisons-similarities or differences-that seemed most interesting and important to make. In general these did not involve comparisons across all countries, but rather among a small group where for various reasons comparison was apt.
The overall project covered three sets of countries where we thought ingroup comparisons would be most interesting. The first group consisted of six large high income countries-the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The second group consisted of four small high income countries, with a strong agricultural or resource base-Denmark, Sweden, Canada, and Australia. Finally, included in the set were five lower income countries-Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel. While we were interested in the similarities and differences across groups, a con-352 siderable amount of thought and effort went into laying out within group comparisons.
As I said at the offset, it is impossible to summarize what came out of this study; I can only give some highlights and a flavor. In the following section I highlight some of the key similarities and differences across countries, and our assessments about what lies behind the differences. Then I report our tentative judgements on what distinguishes systems where firms are strong and innovative from systems where they are not; most of us believe that this has somewhat less to do with aggressive 'technology policies' than current fashion might have one believe. Indeed, many of us believe that the current focus of discussion 'high tech' industries may exaggerate the importance to a nation of having strong national firms in those fields. An important reason is that firms in these industries increasingly are going transnational, which brings me to my next topic: what remains of national systems in a world where business and technology increasingly.are transnational? I conclude by reflecting on the acrimonious aspects of national technology policies.
Country Differences and What Lies Behind Them
To compare means to identify similarities as well as differences. Certainly the broad view of technical innovation which I laid out above and which guided this study implies certain commonalities. That view applies to economies in which profit oriented firms are the principal providers of goods and services, and where central planning and control is weak. These conditions hold in all of the countries in our set, although in some a certain portion of industry is nationalized, and in some governments do try to mold the shape of industrial development in at least a few economic sectors. In all of the countries in our set, the bulk of education, including university education, is conducted in public institutions. In all, the government is presumed to have major responsibility for the funding of basic research, although there are major differences across countries regarding how much of that they do, and where basic research is mostly carried out. From one point of view, what is most striking about the country comparisons is the amount of basic similarity. Had the old Soviet Union been included in the set, or China, or Nigeria, the matter would have been different. But, as it is, the differences across our set of countries must be understood as differences of individuals of the same species.
Within our group of countries, it would appear that to a considerable extent the differences in the innovation systems reflect differences in economic and political circumstances and priorities. First of all, size and the degree of affluence matter a lot. Countries with large affluent populations can provide a 353 market for a wide range of manufacturing industries and may engage in other activities that 'small' countries cannot pursue, at least with any chance of success, and their innovation systems will reflect this. Low income countries tend to differ from high income ones in the kinds of economic activities in which they can have comparative advantage, and in internal demand patterns, and these differences profoundly shape the nature of technical innovation that is relevant. The threefold division of our countries into large high income industrial nations, small high income countries, and low income countries thus turned out to be a useful first cut analytic separation. By and large the economies in the first group had a significantly larger fraction of their economies in R&D intensive industry, like aerospace, electronics, and chemical products, which require large sales to be economic, than economies in the second and third groups. There are some anomalies, at the surface at least. Thus, Sweden in the second group and Israel and Korea in the third have higher R&D to GNP ratios than several of the countries in the first group. Some of the mystery disappears when Israel's ambitious military R&D is recognized, and Sweden's and Korea's strong presence in several R&D intensive industries that live largely through export. Both of the latter two countries also have strong defense programs and this also undoubtedly affected their R&D intensities. There are certain interesting similarities of countries in different groupsJapan and Korea for example. However, by and large there were strong intragroup similarities, and strong inter-group differences. Thus the US and Japan look much less different than advertised, once one brings Australia and Israel into the comparison set. And much of the US-Japan difference can be seen to reside in differences in their resource bases and defence policies.
Whether or not a country had rich natural resources or ample farming land clearly is another important variable influencing the shape of its innovation system. It turns out that all our 'small' high income countries also were well endowed in this respect. Among the large high income countries the US was far and away the best endowed here. Countries that possess resources and good farm land face a different set of opportunities and constraints than countries without these assets.
Countries that lack them must import resources and farm products, which forces their economies towards export-oriented manufacturing, and an innovation system that supports this. One sees this strikingly in the cases of Germany, Japan, and Korea. On the other hand, countries with a rich resource base can support relatively high living standards with farm products and resources and the affiliated industries providing exports to pay for imported manufactured goods. The countries that have been able to do this-Denmark, Canada, and Australia stand out in our set-have developed 354
significant publicly supported R&D programs to back these industries. So also has the United States. While effective agriculture and resource exploitation does require R&D, compared with 'high tech' industry the R&D intensity here is low. The discussion above suggests that, to some extent at least, a nation's innovation system is shaped by factors like size and resource endowments that affect comparatively advantage at a basic level. But it also is true that a nation's innovation system tends to reflect conscious decisions to develop and sustain economic strength in certain areas, that is, it builds and shapes comparative advantage.
Some of the project members were surprised to find in how many of our countries national security concerns had been important in shaping innovation systems.
In the first place, among high income countries defense R&D accounts for the lion's share of the differences among the countries in government funding of industrial R&D, and the presence of large military programs thus explains why government industrial R&D spending in the US, and the UK and France, is so much greater than in Japan and Germany. In the second place, the industries from which the military procures tend to be R&D intensive, whether the firms are selling to the military or to civilians. The study of Japan shows clearly that the present industrial structure was largely put in place during an era when national security concerns were strong. This structure, now oriented to civilian products, is one of the reasons for Japan's high R&D intensity. It is possible that, to some extent, this argument also holds for Germany.
Interestingly, every one of the low income countries in our study has been influenced by national security concerns, or a military government, or both. Thus, much of high tech industry in Israel is largely oriented towards the military. The broad economic policies, industrial structures, and innovation systems of Korea and Taiwan were molded in good part by their felt need to have a capable military establishment. The pockets of 'high tech' atop the basically backward Brazilian and Argentine economies clearly reflect the ambitions of their military elites.
As noted, all of the countries in our set are, basically, ones in which firms are mostly expected to fend for themselves in markets that are, to a considerable extent, competitive. However, all are marked by significant pockets of government overview, funding, and protection. In our countries with big military procurement programs, the defense industries are the largest such pocket. However, in many of our countries government support and protection extends into space, electric power, telecommunications, and other areas of civilian 'high tech'. While by and large these extensions are most significant 355 in the big high income countries, Canada has large public programs in electric power and telecommunications, and so does Sweden. There clearly are significant differences across the nations regarding beliefs about which kind of a role government should play in shaping industrial development. The role of military concerns clearly is a powerful variable influencing this. But a relatively active government also is associated with 'late' development, along the lines put forth by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) . Aside from the arena of national security and related areas, Britain and the US are marked by restrained government. On the other hand, all of our low income late developing countries have quite active governments. However, there certainly are exceptions to this rule. France's Etatism goes way back in history, and while Italy is a late developer except during the Fascist era her government has been weak.
The above discussion suggests that one ought to see considerable continuity in a nation's innovation system, at least to the extent that the basic national objectives and conditions have a continuity. Although this proposition clearly has only limited bearing on the countries in our set that only were formed or gained independence in recent years-Israel, Taiwan, Koreaeven here one can see a certain consistency within these nation's short histories. All of these countries have experienced dramatic improvements in living standards since the 1950s, and their industrial structure has changed markedly. Their innovation systems have changed as well, but as our authors tell the story, in all of these countries today's institutional structures supporting innovation clearly show their origins in those of 30 years ago.
For countries with longer histories, the institutional continuity is striking, at least to the study authors. Thus one can see many of the same things in 1990 in France, Germany, and Japan, that were there in 1890, and this despite the enormous advances in living standards and shifts in industrial structure all have experienced, and the total defeat of the latter two nations in World War II and the stripping away of their military. Britain of 1990 continues many of the institutional characteristics of. Britain in 1890, although they seemed to work better then than now.
Indeed, in this author's eyes, of the countries with long histories the one that has changed most institutionally is the US. The governmental roles in funding university research, and defense R&D, that came into place only after World War II, had little precedent prior to the War, and profoundly changed the nature of the innovation system.
What is Required for Effective Innovative Performance?
We have defined innovation broadly so that the term basically stands for 356
what is required of firms if they are to stay competitive in industries where technological advance is important. Such industries span a large share of manufacturing, many service sectors such as air transport, telecommunications, and medical care, and important areas of agriculture and mining. Staying competitive means different things in different national contexts. For firms located in high wage countries, being competitive may require having a significantly more attractive product or a better production process than firms in low wage countries. For the latter, being competitive may not require being at the forefront. Indeed much of innovation in low income countries involves the learning of foreign technology, its diffusion, and perhaps its adaption to local circumstances of demand or production. But in either kind of country, if technological advance in the industry is significant, staying competitive requires continuing innovation. We, the group that has produced the country studies, think we can discern several basic features that are common to effective innovative performance, and which are lacking or attenuated in countries where innovation arguably has been weak. First, the firms in the industry were highly competent in what mattered to be competitive in their lines of business. Generally this involved competence in product design and production, but usually also effective overall management, ability to assess consumer needs, links into upstream and downstream markets, etc. In most cases significant investments lay behind these firm capabilities. All this enabled firms to master the relevant technologies and other practices needed to compete and to stay up with or lead with new developments.
This observation does contain a hint of tautology, but is better regarded as confirmation of a point stressed above, that the bulk of the effort in innovation needs to be done by the firms themselves. While they may draw on outside developments, significant internal effort and skill is needed to complement and implement these. One cannot read the studies of Japan, Germany, Italy, Korea, and Taiwan, all arguably countries where firms have displayed strong performance in certain industries, without being impressed by the authors' description of the firms. On the other hand, one is impressed the other way by the authors' commentary on the weaknesses of firms in certain industries in Britain, France, Australia, Argentina, and Israel.
Being strong did not necessarily mean that firms were large. Economists long have understood that while in some industries a firm has to be large in order to be a capable innovator, in other industries this is not the case. Many of the strong Italian, Taiwanese, and Danish firms are relatively small. Nor does it mean that the firms spend heavily on formal R&D. In some fields like electronics generally it did, at least for firms in our first two groups of countries; however, in Korea and Taiwan electronics firms often were doing 357 well with technical efforts mostly oriented towards 'reverse engineering'. The Italian textile industry is strong on fashion and design, and are highly innovative in these respects, but little of that work is accounted as R&D.
Nor does it imply that the firms were not benefiting from publicly funded R&D programs, or favored procurement status. However, as our authors describe it, the bulk of the inputs and direction for innovative activity were coming from the firms themselves. While our concept of strong firm entails ability to compete, in all of our cases becoming strong involved actually being exposed to strong competition and being forced to compete. As Michael Porter (1990) has noted, in a number of cases the firms faced strong rivals in their own country. Thus, the Japanese auto and electronics companies compete strongly with each other, American pharmaceutical companies compete and so do Italian clothing producers. However, it is not at all clear that this generalization holds for small countries, where there may be only one or a few national firms as Ericson in Sweden and Northern Telecom in Canada. For these firms most of their competition is with foreign rivals. Porter (1990) and Bengt-Ake Lundvall (1988) have proposed that firms in industries where a country is strong tend to have strong interactive linkages with their upstream suppliers, who also are national firms. Our studies show many cases where this proposition is verified. The supplier networks of Japanese automobile firms, and the upstream-downstream connections in Danish agricultural product processing, are good examples. The cooperation of Italian textile producers with each other and with their equipment suppliers is another. However, there are a number of examples where the proposition does not seem to hold. Pharmaceutical companies, strong in Germany and the US, do not seem generally to have any particularly strong supplier connections, international or national. In aircraft production, the producers of components and sub-components increasingly are located in countries other than that of the system designer and assembler.
A similar observation is obtained regarding the proposed importance of a demanding set of home market customers. In many cases this holds. But in small countries or for industries that from their start have been export oriented, the main customer discipline may come from foreign customers.
While 'strong firms' are the key, that only pushes the question back a stage. Under what conditions do strong firms arise? As the discussion above suggests, to some extent the answer is 'spontaneously 1 . However, our studies do indicate strongly that aspects of the national background in which firms operate matter greatly.
One important feature distinguishing countries that were sustaining competitive and innovative firms was education and training systems that pro-358 vide these firms with a flow of people with the requisite knowledge and skills. For industries where university-trained engineers and scientists were needed, this does not simply mean that the universities provide training in these fields, but also that they consciously train their students with an eye to industry needs. The contrast here between the US and Germany on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, is quite sharp, at least as the authors of our studies draw the picture. Indeed these studies suggest strongly that a principal reason why the former two countries surged ahead of the latter two, around the turn of the century, in the science based industries emerging then is that their university systems were much more responsive to the training needs of industry. While strength in 'high tech" depends on the availabili ty of university trained people, industry more generally requires a supply of literate, numerically competent people in a wide range of functions outside of R&D, who are trained to industry demands either by the firms themselves (as in Japan) or in external training systems linked to firms (as in several German and Swedish industries). Countries differed in the extent to which their public education and training systems combined with private training to provide this supply, and the differences mattered. Thus, among high income countries Germany, Japan, and Sweden came through much stronger in this respect than Britain and Australia. Among developing countries the contrast is equally sharp between Korea and Taiwan on the one hand, and Brazil on the other.
The examples of Korea and Taiwan, and the other Asian 'tigers', can be read as remarkably successful cases of education led growth. As the authors tell the story, the ability of firms in these countries to move quickly from the relatively simple products they produced in the 1950s and 1960s to the much more complex and technologically sophisticated products they produced successfully in the 1980s was made possible by the availability of a young domestic workforce that had received the schooling necessary for the new jobs. On the other hand, the cases of Argentina and Israel suggest that the availability of an educated workforce is not enough by itself. The economic incentives facing firms must be such as to compel them to mind the market and to take advantage of the presence of a skilled work force to compete effectively with their rivals.
Another factor that seems to differentiate countries where firms were effectively innovative from those where they were not is the package of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies. By and large where these combined to make exporting attractive for firms, firms have been drawn to innovate and compete. Where they have made exporting difficult or unattractive, firms have hunkered down in their home markets, and when in trouble called for protection. As I shall indicate later, in some cases at the same time as firms 359 were competing abroad, they were working within a rather protected home market, so the argument is not a simple one for 'free trade'. Rather, it is that export incentives matter significantly because for most countries if firms do not compete on world markets they do not compete strongly. Up until recently the US possibly was an exception to this rule. The US market was large enough to support considerable competition among domestic firms, which kept them on their toes and innovative. No other country could afford the luxury of not forcing their firms to compete on world markets: now the US cannot either. Of course much of the current interest in national systems of innovation reflects a belief that the innovative prowess of national firms is determined to a considerable extent by government policies. Above I have identified two features of the national environment in which firms live that seem to affect their ability and incentives to innovate profoundly, and which are central responsibilities of government in all of the countries in our sample: the education of the work force and the macro-economic climate. But what of government policies and programs more directly targeted at technological advance? This is where much of the contemporary interest is focused. How effective have been these kinds of policies?
In assessing this question in the light of the 15 country systems studied in this project, one strong impression is the wide range of policies targeted at technological advance. Thus, in recent years government policies towards industrial mergers and aquisitions, inter-firm agreements and joint ventures, and allowable industry wide activities, often have been strongly influenced by beliefs about the effects of such policies on innovative performance. Many countries (and the EQ now are encouraging firms to cooperate in R&D of various sorts. Similarly, in recent years a number of governments have worked to restructure or augment financial institutions with the goal of fostering industrial innovation; thus several have tried to establish their analogue to the 'venture capital' market that exists in the US. As suggested, these policies are a very diverse lot and differ from country to country. Our case studies do provide scattered evidence on them, but, simply because they are so diverse, I cannot see any strong generalizations that can be drawn.
Of course our country study authors were primed to look at government programs directly supporting R&D, and here I think the evidence collected is more systematic. It seems useful to distinguish between government programs that largely provide funds for university research or for research in government or other laboratories not tied to particular business firms, and government programs that directly support R&D done in firms. I consider each in turn.
Scholars of innovation now understood that, in many sectors, publicly 360 supported research at universities and in public laboratories is an important part of the sectoral innovation system. A substantial share of the funding of such institutions goes into fields directly connected with technological or industrial needs-fields like agronomy, pathology, computer science, materials science, chemical and electrical engineering. Do our country studies support the proposition that strong research at universities or public laboratories aids a country's firms in innovation, defining that term broadly as we have? Not surprisingly, the answer seems to differ from field to field, and to be sensitive to the mechanisms in place to mold and facilitate interactions with industry. All the countries that are strong and innovative in fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals have strong university research in chemistry and the biomedical sciences. A strong agriculture, and a strong farm product processing industry, is associated in all of our cases with significant research going on relevant to these fields in national universities, or other types of public research institutions dedicated to these industries. In contrast, Argentine agriculture is surprisingly weak, despite favorable natural endowments. The author of the study of Argentina lays the blame on Argentina's failure to develop an adequate agricultural research system.
Where countries have strong electronics firms, for the most part there is some strong research in university departments of electrical engineering, and this would appear to include Japan. Government laboratories have been important sources of new electronic product designs later taken over by firms in Taiwan. On the other hand, university research does not seem of much importance to technical advance in automobiles and aerospace.
Where universities or public laboratories do seem to be helping national firms, one tends to see either direct interactions between particular firms and particular faculty members or research teams, as through consulting arrangements, or mechanisms that tie university or public laboratory programs to groups of firms. Thus in the US agricultural experimentation stations do research of relevance to farmers, and seed producers, and have close interactions with them. Various German universities have programs designed to help machinery producers. Taiwan's electronics industry is closely linked to government laboratories. In all of these cases, the relationships between the university or government labs and the industry are not appropriately described as the universities or public laboratories simply doing research of relevance to the industry in question. The connections were much broader and closer than that, involving information dissemination, and problem solving. Universities and industry were co-partners in a technological community. While not important in all industries, a strong case can be made that such technology and industry oriented public programs have made a big difference in many fields. 361
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These programs are far less politically visible than government programs that directly support industrial R&D, and the latter also tend to involve tar more money. Countries differ significantly in the extent to which the government directly funds industrial R&D. And while most of such programs tend to be concentrated on a narrow range of'high tech' industries, programs of this sort vary significantly and have been put in place for different reasons.
I noted above that, in most of our countries, military R&D accounts for by far the largest portion of government funding of industrial R&D. Analysts have been divided as to whether military R&D and procurement has been a help, or a hinderance, to the commercial competitiveness of national industry. Of the major industrial nations, the US spends by far the largest share of industrial R&D on military projects. A strong case can be made that in the 1960s this helped the American electronics and aircraft industries to come to dominate commercial markets, but that since the late 1960s there has been little 'spillover'. Britain has the second largest of the defense R&D budgets among our set of nations, but most of the companies receiving R&D contracts have shown little capability to crack into non-military markets. The same can be said for most of the French companies. While until recently civilian commercial spillover seldom has been a central objective of military R&D, except in the sense that it was recognized that selling on civilian markets could reduce the public costs of sustaining a strong military procurement base, it is interesting to try to understand where military R&D did lend civilian market strength and where it did not.
Analysis of the US experience suggests that civilian strength is lent when military R&D programs are opening up a broad new generic technology, as contrasted with focusing virtually exclusively on procuring particular new pieces of fancy hardware wanted by the military. Increasingly the US military effort has shifted from the former, to the latter. A much smaller share of military R&D now goes into research and exploratory development than during the 1960s, and a larger share into highly specialized systems development. And the efforts of the other countries in our set who have invested significantly in military R&D-Britain, France, and Israel-have from the beginning focused largely on the latter.
Space programs and nuclear poWeT programs have much in common with military R&D and procurement. They rend to involve the same kind of government agency leadership in determining what is done. They too tend to be concentrated on large scale systems developments. Spillover outside the field has been quite limited.
Government programs in support of company R&D in telecommunications, other civilian electronics, and aircraft may overlap the technical fields supported by military and space programs, and in some cases the support __ 362
at University of Manchester on June 24, 2010 may go to the same companies. These programs also tend to involve the same blend of industrial R&D support, and protection from foreign competition. However, there are several important differences. One is that, compared with military R&D, the public funds almost invariably are much smaller. Indeed programs like Eureka, Esprit, Jessi, Fifth Generation, and Sematech, are small relative to industry funding in the targeted areas. Second, the firms themselves usually have a major say regarding the way the public monies are spent, and the projects are subject to far less detailed public management and overview than are defense projects. Third, these programs are targeted to firms and products in civilian markets, and while their home base may be protected through import restriction or preferential procurement, the hope is that the firms ultimately will be able to stand on their own. Thus, while they involve a commitment to high R&D spending, otherwise these programs have much in common with other 'infant industry' protection programs, many of which have grown up for reasons with no particular connections with national security, or a belief in the importance of 'high tech", but simply because of the desire of a government to preserve or. create a 'national' industry. Infant industry protection, subsidy, and government guidance are policies that have been around for a long long time. They mark French policy since Colbert. During the 19th century and through World War II the US was protectionist. The Japanese and Korean steel and auto industries, which were highly protected up until the 1980s, are more contemporary examples.
Do the infants ever grow up? Some do and some do not. The Japanese auto and electronics companies and the Korean Chaebol based enterprises are well known examples of presently strong firms that grew up in a protected market, but it also should be recognized that the American computer and semiconductor industries grew up with their market shielded from foreign competition and with their R&D funded to a considerable extent by the Department of Defense. After a period of such shelter and support, these firms came to dominate the world's commercial markets. Airbus may be another successful example. On the other hand, the country studies in this project give many examples of protected and subsidized industries which never have got to a stage where the firms can compete on their own. France's electronics industry is a striking example, but so also are the importsubstituting industries of Argentina and Brazil.
What lies behind the differences? If I were to make a bet it is that the differences reside in two things. First, the education and training systems which in some cases did and in others did not provide the protected firms with the strong skills they needed to make it on their own. Second, at least in today's world, the extent to which economic conditions, including 363
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from government policies, provide strong incentives for the firms to quickly start trying to compete on world markets, as contrasted with hunkering down in their protected enclave. The picture of government policies supporting industrial innovation that I have been presenting highlights the diversity of such policies and programs, and their generally fragmented nature-some supporting research and other activities aimed to help industry in universities or public labs, others connected with defense or space or nuclear power, still others aimed directly at supporting or protecting certain industries or industry groups. This is the picture I draw from the country studies of this project. These studies play down the existence of active coherent industrial policies more broadly. The interpretation they present of the industrial policies of nations widely believed to have them is closer to that of modern day infant industry protection with some R&D subsidy, than to a well structured and thought through general policy.
Some readers will dispute this conclusion, arguing that the failure of the studies in this project of countries well known to have active coherent industrial policies to highlight them and their successes reflects a serious misjudgment of the authors. The authors of those studies respond by arguing that in fact government policies in their countries are highly decentralized, and by pointing, the case of Airbus an exception, to the very small fraction of industry R&D accounted for by government programs.
The skeptics rejoin that, while the policies did not involve massive public monies, they had a lot of leverage on private decisions and investments. The authors respond that government leverage has been exaggerated and that where strong policies have been executed, they as often lead to failure as to success. This clearly is the position taken by our Japanese authors on MITI. Without a more fine grained understanding of technological innovation than we now have, there is no way of resolving this debate in a way that will persuade all people.
The Dispute over 'High Tech' Policies
Above I stressed that the bulk of government R&D support, particularly support of industrial R&D, goes into 'high tech', a portion of it through programs expressly designed to lend their firms a commercial edge. Where these latter programs exist, they tend to be complemented by various forms of protection and, sometimes, export subsidy. They are motivated and justified by the argument that if an economy does not have considerable strength in 'high tech' it will be disadvantaged relative to countries that do.
But does this seem to be the case? The logic of the case and the evidence supporting it are not totally compelling. 364
For a firm or industry to be competitive in a high wage country certainly requires that it make effective use of skills, and technological and managerial sophistication, that are not readily available in low wage countries. The 'high tech', high R&D intensity, industries are of this sort, but there are many others as well. The definition of 'high' tech used by statistical agencies is directly tied to R&D intensity. However, we have stressed that an industry can be characterized by considerable innovation and not have a high R&D intensity. If firms are relatively small, or if there is significant design work aimed at particular customers or market niches, while considerable innovation may be going on, the firms may not report much R&D.
Further, while national programs have tended to focus on areas like semiconductors, computers, and new materials, where technical advance clearly is dramatic, much of the economic value created by these advances occurs downstream, in the industries and activities that incorporate these new products into their own processes and products-automobiles, industrial machinery, financial services, shipping. To do this effectively often involves significant innovation and creative innovation here may generate major competitive advantage, but not much in the way of large scale formal R&D may be involved. On the other hand, it can be argued that active government policies often can be more effective when aimed to help an industry take advantage of new upstream technologies than when oriented towards subsidizing major breakthroughs. A large portion of the clearly effective public programs discussed in the various country studies of this project were or are focused on bringing an industry up to world practice (this certainly characterizes many of the successful Japanese programs) or to spread knowledge about new developments (American agriculture and several of the government programs in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden).
Of course, the lure of 'high tech' to countries that know they must be highly innovative if they are to compete with lower wage countries is not based solely on statistical illusion. The discussion above acknowledges the special place of innovation in semiconductors, computers, new materials, and the like in the contemporary pattern of industrial innovation more broadly. Advances in these fields provide the building blocks, the key opportunities, for technical innovation in a wide range of downstream industries, from high speed trains to cellular telephones to commercial banking. Many observers noting this have proposed that a nation that wants its firms to be strong over the coming years in the downstream industries had better not let foreign firms control the key upstream technologies. This argument is prevalent in some newly developing countries, like Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan, as well as today's high income ones.
Another argument seems to square the circle. It is that a nation needs to 365 :
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have strength in the downstream industries in order to provide a market for the key component industries. Thus, nations are supporting firms working on high definition television, and telecommunications, partly on the argument that in the absence of a home market a nation's semiconductor and computer firms will be disadvantaged. Similarly, public support of aerospace is justified partly on alleged stimulation to upstream technology. Put more generally, the argument is that 'high tech' industries generate unusually large 'externalities', which flow to national downstream firms. This possibility is one of those modeled in what has come to be called the 'new trade theory' (see e.g. Krugman, 1987) which has developed a collection of arguments which support subsidy or protection as a means of gaining real national advantage. The fact that these industries are natural oligopolies who, in equilibrium, likely will support higher than average profits or wages, is another 'new trade theory' argument sometimes used to rationalize protection or subsidy, on the grounds that subsidy now will yield high returns later.
The authors of our country studies clearly have different, and perhaps mixed, minds about this matter. There is a certain plaintiveness expressed in the studies of the major European countries that, while doing well in some other areas, national firms are not doing well in these critical 'high tech' fields. The authors of the studies of Australia and Canada, on the other hand, seem to regard electronics envy as silly and expensive fadism.
While our country studies cannot resolve the issues, they can at least bring to attention three matters that ought to give pause to the zealots. In the first place, there does not seem to be strong empirical support for the proposition that national economies are broadly advantaged if their firms are especially strong in high tech, and disadvantaged if they are not. Thus, the United States continues to be strong (and a major net exporter) in a wide range of 'high technology' R&D intensive industries, but its economic growth has been lagging badly for nearly 20 years. Italy has very limited capacity in these industries, but its overall productivity and income levels have been growing briskly for many years. One can argue that France has had broad economic success more despite her efforts to nurture and subsidize her high technology industries than because of them. Japan is strong in DRAMS, but also in automobile production which accounts for much more employment and export value, and her efficiency in producing cars seems to have little to do with 'high tech'. And Canada, Australia, Denmark, and the United States all continue to be strongly competitive in industries based on agriculture or natural resources.
Also, as we have noted, the record of national policies expressly aimed to help high tech industries through support of industrial R&D and protection -= 366 is very uneven. Indeed, the strongest positive examples occurred long ago, when the US government provided broad support for advances in electronics and aircraft, and the American edge here has not proved to be durable. Other successful cases are largely 'infant industry' cases (e.g. Japanese electronics during the 1960s and 1970s, and Korea during the early 1980s) where, as the companies became strong, the active and protective role of government diminished. Airbus may (or may not) be a contemporary success story. However, by and large the success record is not very good. Moreover, and of crucial importance, firms and projects in the aircraft and electronics industries are rapidly becoming transnational. Partly this is because of a need to share very high up-front R&D costs, which can be met by joining with other firms. Traditional intra-national rivalries tend to make firms look for foreign partners. And this tendency, of course, is increased to the extent that governments try to keep the products of foreign firms out of domestic markets and to channel subsidy to national firms. Unless the home market is very rich and the subsidies very high, firms have strong incentives to somehow form links with other firms so that they have a chance at other markets.
Today, there probably is no other matter which so forces one to step back, and consider the contemporary meaning of a 'national innovation system'. To what extent are there really 'innovation systems', and to the extent that there are, in what ways are they defined by nation states?
What Remains National About Innovation Systems?
There obviously are a number of difficulties with the concept of a 'national innovation system". In the first place, unless one defines innovation very narrowly and cuts the institutional fabric to that narrow definition, and we did neither, it is inevitable that analysis of innovation in a country sometimes would get drawn into discussion of labor markets, financial systems, monetary fiscal and trade policies, etc. One cannot draw a line neatly around those aspects of a nation's institutional structure that are concerned predominantly with innovation in a narrow sense excluding everything else, and still tell a coherent story about innovation in a broad sense. Nonetheless, most of our authors were able to tell a pretty coherent story about innovation in their country focusing largely on institutions and mechanisms that fit the narrow definition, with discussion of country institutions more broadly serving largely as a frame.
Second, the term suggests much more uniformity and connectedness within a nation than is the case. Thus, one can discuss Canadian agriculture pretty independently of Canadian telecommunications. R&D and innovation 367 in the American pharmaceutical industry and R&D an aircraft by American companies have little in common. And yet, one cannot read the studies of Japan, Germany, France, Korea, Argentina, and Israel, to name just a few, without coming away with the strong feeling that nationhood matters and has a persuasive influence. In all these cases, a distinctive national character pervades the firms, the educational system, the law, the politics, and the government, all of which have been shaped by a shared historical experience and culture. I believe that most of us would square these somewhat divergent observations as follows. If one focuses narrowly on what we have defined as 'innovation systems' these tend to be sectorally specific. However, if one broadens the focus the factors that make for commonality across sections within a country, the wider set of institutions referred to above, comes into view and these largely define the factors that make for commonality across sectors within a country.
From the start of this project we recognized that borders around nations are porous, and increasingly so. Indeed, one of the questions that motivated this study was whether or not the concept of national innovation systems made sense anymore. I suspect that many of us come out on this as follows.
It is a safe bet that there will be increasing internationalization of these aspects of technology that are reasonably well understood scientifically. Efforts on the part of nations, and firms, to keep new understandings won in R&D privy increasingly will be futile. Among firms with the requisite scientific and technical people, the competitive edge will depend on the details of design, of production process, of firm strategy and organization, upstreamdownstream connections, etc. Today, this is quite clearly the case in fields like semiconductors, aircraft, computers and automobiles. In these fields, there are no broad technological secrets possessed by individual countries or particular firms. On the other hand, strong firms have a good deal of firm specific know-how and capability.
It is also a good bet that differences across firms stamped into them by national policies, histories, and cultures, will diminish in importance. Partly that will be because the world is becoming much more unified culturally, for better or for worse. Partly it will be because firm managers and scholars of management increasingly are paying attention to how firms in other countries are organized and managed. And cross-country inter-firm connections are likely to grow in importance. Firms in industries where there are large up front R&D design and production engineering costs increasingly are forging alliances with firms in other countries, to share some of the costs, and to get over government-made market barriers. The establishment of branch plants in protected countries or regions is another mechanism. Thus, increasingly, 368
at University of Manchester on June 24, 2010 the attempts of national governments to define and support a national industry will be frustrated because of internationalization. What will remain of 'national systems'? The firms that reside in the country, for one thing, but people and governments will have to get used to dealing with plants whose headquarters are abroad. The countries of Europe have been struggling with this matter for some time, and many of the Latin American countries, too. The US is now having to try to deal with this, and Japan and Korea are beginning to. As yet, no large country seems to have made its peace with the problem, however. While in most countries, resident firms will be largely national, the presence of 'foreign' firms in important industries is something that nations will have to learn to cope with better.
We noted earlier the striking continuity of a nation's basic institutions bearing on industrial innovation. A good example is national education systems, which sometimes seem never to change in their basics. While top level scientists and engineers may be highly mobile, and some high level students will continue to take training abroad, below the PhD level, by and large, countries will be stuck with their nationals who are trained at home. The nation's system of university research and public laboratories will continue to be, largely, national, particularly the programs that are specifically keyed to advancing technology or otherwise facilitating technical progress in industry, and with built in mechanisms for interacting with industry. These programs will have to work with foreign branch firms as well as domestic ones in certain fields. But the notion that universities and public laboratories basically provide 'public goods' and that therefore there are no advantages to firms that have close formal links simply does not fit the facts in many industries.
The nation's other public infrastructure, and laws, its financial institutions, its fiscal monetary and trade policies, and its general economic ambiance, still will be a major influence on economic activity, including innovating, and these are very durable. For large high income countries at least, the lion's share of private investment will continue to be domestic, and constrained by domestic savings. And nations will continue to have their own distinaive views of the appropriate relationships between government and business. And these will strongly influence a nation's policies bearing explicitly on science and technology. From the evidence in this study, these must be understood as an agglomeration of policies directed towards different national objectives, each with a somewhat special domain in terms of the fields and the institutions most affected, rather than as a coherent package.
All can hope that there will be a significant diminution of defense programs, but it is a safe bet that military R&D will continue to account for 369 Outside of defense and space, a nation's programs of R&D support will in all likelihood continue to reflect both the needs of industry and broad attitudes towards what government should be doing and how. While there will be exceptions particularly when a defense connection is argued, the United States will continue to resist programs that directly fund industrial R&D, but will use the universities as the base for a variety of programs including some directly targeted at certain technologies and industries. European countries are likely to make much more use of programs that directly support civil industrial R&D, either in individual firms, or in industry wide research organizations. And in Japan, France, and various other countries, government agencies and high tech firms will continue to be quite close.
The Diversity of National Systems: Do We Need Some Standards Regarding What is Fair?
At the present time nations seem to be conscious as never before of their 'innovation systems' and how they differ from those of their peers. This consciousness of differences is leading in two very different directions. On the one hand, it is leading to attempts on the part of nations to adopt aspects of other systems that they see as lending them strength. However, the experimentation is far from systematic, and it is highly influenced by perceptions that may have little contact with reality. Thus, the US and the European countries (and the EC) have been loosening laws that restrict interfirm R&D cooperation, and establishing programs to encourage and subsidize it in some areas. If the chapter on Japan has got it right, this may be somewhat ironic in view of the argument that the role in Japan's rapid post-war growth of cooperative R&D among firms in the same line of business probably has been exaggerated, and in any case is diminishing.
The LDCs are looking, with good reason, to Korea and Taiwan for models. But, aside from their strong support of education, high levels of investment in plant and equipment, and their pressure on firms" to go for exports, these two countries have quite different innovation systems. In one, Taiwan, government research laboratories have been an important source of industrial technology; in the other, Korea, apparently they have not at least until recently. Korea has encouraged the growth of large industrial conglomerates, and resisted foreign ownership; Taiwan has not especially encouraged the growth of large firms and has admitted foreign firms selectively. But 370 both have been successful in building innovative competitive manufacturing industry based on foreign created technologies and other low income countries are trying to learn from their experience. While today attempts at emulation are at a peak, they are nothing new. The study of Japan shows how earlier in the century the Japanese tried to pick and choose from European and American experience, and came out with something quite different. The Americans earlier tried to adopt the German university system, and actually built a very different one.
At the same time, perceptions of differences are leading nations to declare certain aspects of their rival's systems as illegitimate. Prominent Americans have expressed the opinion that MITI support and guidance of key Japanese industries, together with the special connections between Japanese firms and their customers and their sources of finance, amount to an unfair system, involving subsidy and dumping as well as protection. Similar complaints have been lodged against Eureka and Airbus. The Europeans complain about Japan, and about US programs like the SDI claiming that such large scale government R&D support, while aimed at a military target, is sure to build commercial advantages, and that that requires response on their part. The Japanese make similar complaints, but particularly about the import barriers being imposed by other countries. Some have gone so far as to argue that presently there is a war between competing national innovation systems that only can be resolved if there are new accepted standards regarding what is fair and what is not (see e.g. Ostry, 1990) . Otherwise, nations will have to adopt the norm of managed trade in high technology products.
These two aspects of the current concern about differences in national innovation systems-attempts at emulation, and expressions of hostilityare opposite sides of the same coin. They reflect a combination of beliefs that a nation's performance in 'high tech' is vital to its broader economic performance and security, real uncertainty regarding just how to achieve high performance, and lack of agreed upon criteria for judging what are legitimate and illegitimate government policies.
In my view, which may not be shared by all of my colleagues, the current brou ha ha seems somewhat hysterical. There is little more reason to get upset over inter-country differences in the government's role in the support and protection in 'high tech' than about other areas where government policies differ sharply. For one thing, governments' anguish that their economies are fated to be surely disadvantaged if they do not have a 'high tech' industry of their own probably is unwarranted. For another, beliefs that strength in high tech is due largely to promotional government policies seem grossly exaggerated.
At the same time, the studies in this project show that the institutional 371 Economists are wont to draw the line in terms of whether or not government spending or regulation or guidance can be justified by market failure arguments. If so, while public action may give advantage to a particular national industry, such support can be argued to increase economic efficiency. If not, it is considered naked subsidy or protection, and is not to be condoned. Thus, while international trade theorists long have known that a nation could enhance the well being of its own citizens vis-a-vis those in other countries by selected naked subsidy or protection, the argument was that, under the theory then in vogue, for nations taken as a group, this was a negative sun game.
But the problem with this line of argument here is that 'market failure' is ubiquitous in the activities associated with industrial innovation, and thus subsidy or protection or guidance could be efficiency enhancing; hence the game of active industrial policy need not be negative sum. What has come to be called 'the new trade theory' recognizes some of this, nervously. If there are large 'up front" R&D costs, or significant learning through doing or using, or major externalities in certain activities like research and training, the simple arguments that free trade is 'Pareto Optimal' (in the parlance of economists) falls apart.
Of course 'market failure' is greater in certain activities than in others. Also, government competence and incentives are more likely to lead to productive programs in certain arenas than in others. Further, it is apparent that competitive protection and subsidy among nations can get beyond any level conceivably justified on grounds of'efficiency'. It is in the interest of all nations to reign in such tendencies.
However, it seems unlikely that simple rules-for example that government support of R&D on public sector needs and for 'basic' research is efficient and fair and direct support of industrial R&D aimed to develop products for a civilian market is both inefficient and unfair-will carry the discussion very far. This argument certainly can be used to attack Airbus. But Europeans rejoin that government help was needed to overcome the huge headstart American companies had won in large part as a spillover from 372 military R&D, and can be justified economically both on infant industry grounds, and as a policy to avoid the development of a one company world monopoly. And what of government support for telecommunications R&D where telecommunications is a government service? Americans are prone to argue that telecommunications should be privatized, but there surely is limited agreement on that. One can try, and with some hope of success, to open government procurement to bids from foreign firms. However, what to one eye is blockage to competition in public procurement to another is a valuable close relationship between customer and steady supplier. Nor are there clean lines separating 'basic research' from applied. No one seems to object to government support for research on the causes of cancer (although a breakthrough here may give the firms with close contact with the research a major advantage in coming up with a proprietary product). But what about research to advance agricultural productivity? To deal improve crops growing in a particular national soil and climate? Research on superconductivity, or on surface phenomena in semiconductors, conducted in universities? Conducted in an industry cooperative research organization? In a particular firm?
The argument about whether government funding of certain kinds of R&D is appropriate and efficient or unfair subsidy of course gets intertwined with arguments about protection, and about constraints in direct foreign investments. Here countries clearly disagree regarding what they regard as appropriate. The disagreements can be discussed, and agreements negotiated. However, it does not seem to me that the question of whether or not a protected industry is 'high tech" changes the nature of the discussion, or the stakes, that much.
All this is no argument against trying to establish some norms and rules regarding government policies bearing on industrial innovation, and in certain areas aiming for uniform or at least comparable policies. However, it is an argument against one nation or another getting self righteous that its ways are efficient, fair, and quite justified, and the policies of other nations are not. And it is an argument againt the belief that agreeing on ground rules will be simple, if only the advice of economists is heeded.
And finally, it is an argument against trying to impose too much uniformity. Countries differ in their traditions, ideologies, and beliefs about appropriate roles for government, and they will guard the differences they think matter. A central reason why this project was undertaken was, by expanding the set of countries considered, and by trying to enable comparisons where these seemed most interesting, to try to tease out what features of national systems seemed systematically to enhance innovation performance, and what features seemed useless or worse. My colleagues and I like to 373 believe that we have learned a good deal. But there still is a lot of room for informed differences of opinion. Given that there is, it is not simply inappropriate for one group or another to argue for its preferred uniformity. While (as this project testifies) it is not easy to tease out signal from noise, potentially we all can learn from each other about what seems to be effective and what is not.
